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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Entrapment is a relatively new criminal defense in the long history of
criminal law. Entrapment, an affirmative defense, requires the defendant
in a criminal action to meet the burden of production before the court
will send the issue to the jury. Courts and legislatures developed the
defense within the last century both as a judicially created right and a
statutory right.' Courts and statutes expanded the use of entrapment in
response to the use of undercover or sting operations by the police. 2 The
Fourth Circuit previously noted that the entrapment defense rests on the
idea that the purpose of law enforcement should be to prevent crimes,
not to manufacture crimes. 3 In asserting the entrapment defense the
defendant must show some evidence that the government induced the
defendant to commit an offense. In short, the defendant only can prevail
in an entrapment claim if government deception implanted criminal intent
in the defendant's mind.
The Fourth Circuit adheres to traditional rules in the entrapment area
and generally allows defendants' claims of entrapment to go to the jury.
To succeed in getting an entrapment defense before a jury, the defendant
must show evidence "beyond a mere scintilla." Defendants asserting the
entrapment defense have alleged constitutional violations of their Fifth
Amendment Due Process rights. In looking to the government's conduct
in the matter, the Fourth Circuit additionally has adhered to majority
rules in the due process area. Specifically, for the defendant to prove a
due process violation government conduct must be "outrageous" in the
sense that it shocks the conscience of the court.
Against this background, in United States v. Osborne, 935 F.2d 32
(4th Cir. 1991), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered the validity of a convicted defendant's challenge to his conviction on both due process and entrapment grounds. Osborne charged that
the government had violated his due process rights in two ways: 1) that
the government did not demonstrate a reasonable suspicion of criminal
behavior before commencing a sting operation; and 2) that the government's conduct in sending several mailings to Osborne was outrageous.

1. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1972) (holding that entrapment
defense prohibits law enforcement officials from instigating criminal acts by otherwise innocent
people); United States v. Osborne, 935 F.2d 32, 37 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that entrapment
defense prevents government from inventing crimes against innocent people).
2. See generally PAuL MARcus, Tum ENnTAPMENT DEFENSE (1989).
3. See United States v. DeVore, 423 F.2d 1068, 1070 (4th Cir. 1970) (holding that
government is authorized to provide opportunities designed to encourage one who already is

predisposed to commit crime).
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The defendant also alleged that the district court erred by not allowing
Osborne's defense of entrapment to go to the jury.
In Osborne, with the purpose of running a sting operation, the U.S.
Postal Inspector in Nashville advertised pornography in a video publication
and indicated that a purchaser could buy pornographic videos from catalogues. Osborne responded to the inspector with a letter expressing interest
in purchasing child pornography videos. The Inspector then mailed Osborne a questionnaire and a list of available films. Osborne continued the
exchange by returning the questionnaire and providing an address for UPS
delivery. The Inspector then sent an order form to Osborne, who requested
two videotapes.
After the receipt of Osborne's order, the Postal Inspector delivered
the tapes, according to Osborne's request, to a North Carolina address.
Federal officers subsequently obtained a search warrant and seized the
tapes from Osborne. Pursuant to the seizure, Osborne was arrested and
indicted for knowingly receiving sexually explicit videotapes depicting
minors engaged in obscene conduct. The state charged Osborne with
violating 18 U.S.C. section 2252(a)(2) which governs the receipt of sexually
explicit materials.
Osborne moved to dismiss the indictment claiming that the alleged
charges violated Osborne's due process rights. In a pretrial decision, the
district court denied Osborne's motion to dismiss. The district court also
found that because Osborne had shown a predisposition to commit the
crime charged, Osborne could not use the defense of entrapment at his
trial. Osborne was convicted of the charged violation and sentenced to
twelve months in jail, a $3,000 fine and three years supervised release.
Osborne appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the district court
erred in failing to dismiss the indictment on due process grounds and in
failing to allow Osborne to raise the entrapment defense at trial. Prior to
dealing with the defendant's two major contentions, the Fourth Circuit
disposed of two less viable arguments. Osborne had argued that because
the postal inspector delivered the tapes to Osborne's brother's house,
Osborne did not knowingly receive the tapes. The Fourth Circuit used a
common sense approach and found that because Osborne had requested
that the tapes be sent to his brother's house, Osborne did knowingly
receive them. Osborne also challenged the district judge's refusal to depart
from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and give Osborne a lower sentence.
The Fourth Circuit found that because the district court was aware that
it could give Osborne a lower sentence, and it did not do so, Osborne's
challenge failed.
The Fourth Circuit next dealt with the defendant's due process claim.
The Fourth Circuit found that the government need not have a suspicion
of the defendant to offer the defendant an opportunity to commit a crime.
Citing its own decision in Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128 (4th Cir.
1924), the Fourth Circuit affirmed that when the government affords one
the opportunity to commit a crime, the government merely solicits and is
incapable of inducing an otherwise innocent person to commit a crime.
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In dealing with the outrageous conduct prong of the defendant's due
process claim, the Fourth Circuit reiterated the standard constituting
outrageous government conduct. The Fourth Circuit noted that government
conduct must be so outrageous that the conduct shocks the conscience of
the court. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit warned future defendants
hoping to make a claim of entrapment that the Fourth Circuit has a high
shock threshold. To emphasize the Fourth Circuit's shock threshold, the
court cited its decision in United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir.
1988), finding that a sting operation aimed at child pornography did not
constitute outrageous conduct.
Finally, to analyze the defendant's entrapment claim, the Fourth
Circuit employed a test derived from both its own past cases and a case
cited favorably by the Supreme Court.4 The Fourth Circuit maintained
that predisposition is the essential element of entrapment and rejected the
"objective" view that the government action is sufficient to prove an
entrapment claim. The Fourth Circuit noted that an entrapment claim will
succeed if the defendant shows that the government conduct implanted
criminal intent in the defendant. The defendant must show, however, some
evidence that the government induced him to commit an offense that he
was otherwise not predisposed to commit. Although the burden of production is small, the court required defendants to meet the burden.
Under the Fourth Circuit's standards of both entrapment and due
process, the defendant's challenges failed. Because the court did not require
government suspicion to justify the government's solicitation of Osborne,
Osborne could not successfully argue that the government lacked reasonable suspicion. Osborne also failed to show that the sting operation was
outrageous. Compared to far more egregious sting operations that the
Fourth Circuit had determined were not outrageous, the one that led to
Osborne's arrest, according to the Fourth Circuit, was far below the high
shock threshold. Finally, in an attempt to meet the burden of production
for an entrapment defense, Osborne argued that because the government
solicited him, he was not predisposed to commit the crime. The Fourth
Circuit found, however, that solicitation alone was insufficient to negate
predisposition to commit a crime. In short, Osborne did not show the
"scintilla" of evidence needed to raise the entrapment defense at trial.
Finding that no error was committed by the district court, the Fourth
Circuit upheld the conviction.
The Fourth Circuit's holding that the government needs no reasonable
suspicion before offering a citizen the opportunity to commit a crime
creates a conflict between the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. In United States
v. Luttrell, 899 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit held that the
government violates due process when without reasonable suspicion it
provides an innocent person with an opportunity to commit a crime. The

4. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988) (stating that principle element
of entrapment is predisposition and not government behavior).
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Fourth Circuit, however, is in accord with almost all the other circuits on

the reasonable suspicion issue.'
The Fourth Circuit's approach to entrapment and due process in
Osborne is consistent with the approach of other circuits and the Supreme
Court. The Fourth Circuit opinion in Osborne is slightly unusual, however,
because the defendant is not allowed to bring the entrapment issue to the

jury. Under Osborne the defendant has a low burden of production, but
Osborne stands for the principle that the defendant must meet that burden.
The effect of Osborne will be to discourage defendants from raising
groundless defenses of entrapment. Similarly, the due process analysis in
Osborne could lead to fewer successful challenges to government sting
operations.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, paper,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ....-6
Courts traditionally consider the administration of blood alcohol and
breathalyzer tests as constituting a search within the scope of the Fourth

Amendment. 7 As such, the administering of these tests invokes the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement, which requires that a probable cause
showing be made and a warrant be issued prior to a search. However,
there are at least two recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement:

the search incident to lawful arrest exception and the exigent circumstances
exception. The search incident to lawful arrest exception allows a police

officer to search a lawfully arrested individual for weapons, instruments
of escape and evidence of crime.' Alternatively, the exigent circumstances
exception recognizes that there are emergency circumstances where the
"special needs" of the state will justify waiver of the warrant requirement. 9

Courts, in a variety of contexts, have addressed the question of whether
breathalyzer or blood alcohol tests that are administered without a warrant
5. See United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 468 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that
government does not need reasonable grounds to offer otherwise innocent defendant opportunity to commit crime), cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 1618 (1991); United States v. Jenrette, 744
F.2d 817, 829 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985); United States
v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 860 (10th Cir. 1984) (same); United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d
1191, 1198-99 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984); United States v. Myers,
635 F.2d 932, 941 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v.
Velasquez, 802 F.2d 104, 106 (4th Cir. 1986) (same); Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128,
132 (4th Cir. 1924) (same).
6. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.

7. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989) (holding
that blood tests and breathalyzer test constitutes Fourth Amendment "search"); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966) (same); Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806
F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
8. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977) (discussing seizures incident
to lawful arrest); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455-57 (1971) (same).
9. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987) (discussing exigent circumstances
exception).
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legitimately fall within either of these two recognized exception categories.' 0
In examining whether the exigent circumstances exception applies, courts
typically employ a balancing approach. Such an approach weighs the
state's interests or "special needs" in specific circumstances against the
individual's interest in freedom from an unreasonable search." In light of
these precedents, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered the question of whether the administration of a breathalyzer
test without a warrant fell within either exception to the warrant requirement.
In United States v. Reid, 929 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth
Circuit considered the appeal of two women whose convictions of driving
while intoxicated were based on the results of a warrantless breathalyzer
test. Police officers arrested both Reid and Boyle after stopping them to
determine the cause of their erratic driving. The officer pulled over Reid
after he observed her speeding and having difficulty remaining within the
lanes of the George Washington Memorial Parkway. Upon stopping her
and smelling alcohol on her breath, the officer asked Reid to perform
three field sobriety tests. Reid failed all three tests; the officer then arrested
her and took her to the police station. At the station, the police advised
Reid that 36 C.F.R. § 4.23 required her to submit to a blood alcohol test
or face the criminal charge of refusal. A conviction of refusal carries a
penalty of $500, imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both. Reid
consented to a breathalyzer test and signed the corresponding notice and
waiver. The police administered two separate breath tests that resulted in
blood alcohol levels of .144 and .148, respectively. The officer then arrested
Reid, charging her with driving under the influence of alcohol (D.U.I.)
and driving with a breath alcohol content of .10 or more, in violation of
36 C.F.R. § 4.23.
Police stopped Boylan under similar circumstances. An officer pulled
over Boylan when he observed her driving outside of the marked parkway
lanes at an unusually slow speed. Detecting alcohol on Boylan's breath,
the officer administered four field sobriety tests, all of which Boylan

10. See generally Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (examining
mandatory blood and breath tests for employees involved in train accidents); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (considering extraction of blood sample after defendant's
involvement in accident and arrest); Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.) (reviewing
forced extraction of blood from lawfully arrested drunk driver refusing test), cert. denied sub
nom. Newport Beach v. Hammer, 112 S.Ct. 582 (1991); United States v. Berry, 866 F.2d 887
(6th Cir. 1988) (considering extraction of blood sample from unconscious defendant involved
in accident); Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986) (analyzing
state police practice of taking breath samples incident to D.W.I. arrests); Burka v. New York
Transit Auth., 739 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (examining mandatory drug testing for
applicants for "safety-sensitive" positions), amd. denied, 744 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
11. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 618-21 (1986) (balancing
state's interest in regulating conduct of railroad employees in "safety-sensitive" positions
against individual's interest in avoiding unreasonable searches).
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failed. The officer then arrested Boylan and took her to the station. After
being advised that if she refused a breathalyzer test she would be charged
with refusal, Boylan consented to the test. She scored a .207 blood alcohol
level; police charged her with impeding traffic, disobeying a road marking,
and D.U.I. in violation of 36 C.F.R. §§ 4.12, 4.13(b), and 4.23, respectively.
In separate trials before the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, both Reid and Boylan moved to suppress the evidence
of their breathalyzer test, arguing that the test was a warrantless search
in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. They based their arguments
on two grounds. First, that the search was not proper under either the
exigent circumstances or search incident to lawful arrest exceptions; and
second, that their consent to the tests was coerced and invalid. The same
magistrate denied both motions and convicted each woman. Both Reid
and Boylan subsequently appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which consolidated their appeals into one action. The appeals alleged that the lower
court judge erroneously denied their motions to suppress the evidence of
their breathalyzer tests.
On appeal de novo the Fourth Circuit in Reid considered whether
breathalyzer tests fell within any exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. In considering the scope of exceptions to the
warrant requirement, the Reid Court relied on Skinner v. Railway Executive Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989), and reasoned that the Fourth Amendment did not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only unreasonable
ones. The Fourth Circuit recognized that usually a search or seizure is not
reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a warrant. Yet, the Fourth
Circuit noted that in Skinner the Supreme Court recognized certain exceptions to this rule, when "special needs," beyond the normal demands
faced in law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirements impractical. The Fourth Circuit stated that when faced with "special
needs," the Supreme Court balanced the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant requirement in the particular
context. Because the Supreme Court also established that subjecting a
person to a breathalyzer test is a Fourth Amendment "search," the Fourth
Circuit concluded that a warrant was required in Reid unless one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement was present.
Citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the Fourth Circuit
noted that one established exception to the warrant requirement occurs
where there are exigencies in a situation that make an exemption from the
warrant requirement "imperative." The Fourth Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court also recognized such exemptions in both Skinner and
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1981), where the delay in obtaining
a warrant might result in the destruction of evidence of alcohol in the
body. While Reid and Boylan argued that the police could obtain a warrant
by telephone as allowed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(c)(2),
the Fourth Circuit held that compliance with the extensive requirements
of a telephone warrant would demand too much time and would risk the

1992]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

loss of invaluable evidence. In dismissing the possibility that a warrant
could be efficiently obtained, the court therefore acknowledged the existence of exigent circumstances that would exempt the police from the
warrant requirement.
In light of several recent Supreme Court decisions, the Reid Court
concluded that the Supreme Court recognized a compelling state interest
in protecting its citizens from drunk drivers and that the breathalyzer test
is the least intrusive of Fourth Amendment searches. The Fourth Circuit
found that the Supreme Court repeatedly has noted the gravity of the
drunk driving problem in modern society. The Court has upheld several
intrusions on an individual's Fourth Amendment rights in an attempt to
alleviate the crisis posed by drunk driving. For example, in Schmerber the
Court allowed the forcible extraction of blood over defendant's objections,
and in Michigan State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), the Court
upheld sobriety check-points that were set up on roads to catch drunk
drivers. The Court also held in Skinner that breathalyzer tests and blood
tests intrinsically do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit
stated that these factors support the invocation of the exigent circumstances
exception where police officers are acting lawfully to decrease the toll of
drunk driving on the nation's highways. Thus, because of the exigent
circumstances of the situation, the Fourth Circuit held that the warrantless
searches of Reid and Boylan were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis in Reid also noted that an additional
exception to the warrant requirement existed in Reid and Boylan's cases.
Police officers conducted both searches incident to lawful arrest. Relying
on United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), the Fourth Circuit held
that the fact of lawful arrest establishes the authority to search. Given
the lawfulness of both women's custodial arrest, a full search of the person
is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment but is a reasonable search under the amendment.
The Reid Court refrained from addressing appellants' second argument
that their consent was coerced and, therefore, invalid. Appellants based
their coercion argument on the fact that the police informed the plaintiffs
that if they did not consent to the breathalyzer tests, they could be charged
with refusal which carried significant penalties. Because of this alleged
coercion, both women claim that their consent was "tainted" and, therefore, invalid. However, given the court's finding that both searches were
reasonable without the consent, the Reid court did not need address
plaintiffs' claims.
In summary, the Fourth Circuit held that the appellants were lawfully
arrested at the time they were searched. The police stopped each woman
pursuant to an officer's observations that each was driving in a suspicious
manner, based on an individualized determination of suspicion. After each
woman failed several sobriety tests, the police lawfully arrested each
woman, took each to the police station and performed a search (breathalyzer test) incident to a lawful arrest. Additionally, the Reid court

